Programme
for the
First International Symposium on Buddhism & Neoplatonism

In Enneads 5.3, Plotinus considers the reflexive nature of Intellect (nous) and the form of its self-knowledge, arguing that this knowledge is comprehensible only on the basis of its self- actualizing activity, in which intellect and the intelligible are necessarily unified (5.3.5) and is thus the (self-) intellection of substance or being (ousiōdēs noēsis). With this, Plotinus invokes a prominent and often-repeated conception of Western idealism up to Hegel, whereby the self- knowing of reflexive consciousness is sufficient to yield an adequate knowledge of the constitutive forms of being. At the same time, he argues later in the chapter that the One itself, owing to its utter simplicity, is beyond any possibility of reflexivity, as it is beyond any possibility of knowledge itself, and can thus be spoken of only in negative or negative-theological terms (5.3.14). In the Madhyamakalankara (Ornament of the Middle Way), while acknowledging the conventional existence of reflexive self-consciousness (svasemvedana) (verses 16-18), Śāntarakṣita nevertheless (verses 42-55) treats the Cittamatra idealist doctrine of mind as the actualization of potentially reflexive self-consciousness as only the ultimate step on the ladder of positions to be overcome on the way to Madhyamaka itself. His argument for the overcoming of the Cittamatra doctrine is the one known in the later tradition as the argument of “neither one nor many:” mind is necessarily a unity if it exists at all, but any account of the multiplicity of its cognition fails to capture this underlying unity. The Cittamatra view is thus to be rejected in favor of the Madhyamaka claims that all defining features and relations are to be found only within conventional – rather than ultimate – reality, and that even self-conscious mind cannot ultimately be accorded as having any substantial reality (svabhāva). While both philosophers thus argue from the inherent multiplicity that appears to be invoked by any doctrine of reflexive self-consciousness to a position, beyond it, marked by utter simplicity, the actual conclusions drawn are markedly different, Plotinus arguing for an ultimately originary One that lies beyond any possibility of description, and Śāntarakṣita arguing for the ultimate emptiness of distinction itself. In this paper, I consider these closely parallel arguments and divergent conclusions of Plotinus and Śāntarakṣita with a view to illuminating the underlying formal issues about reflexivity, unity, and simplicity on which both turn. I argue: i) that the parallels in the arguments witness deep-seated and logically irreducible paradoxes of reflexivity in relation to the predication of unity or Oneness itself, problems that are elsewhere treated in detail, and without resolution, by Plato (in the “dialectical exercise” of the Parmenides) and by Nāgārjuna (in the Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way); and ii) that the marked divergence between the two philosophers’ ways of resolving these problems is largely a result of the pervasive role played in Plotinus’s argumentation by the (Aristotelian) idea of power as dunamis and its distinction from energeia (actuality or activity), an idea and distinction which is, by contrast, not credited by Madhyamaka philosophers, for reasons related to the underlying logical problems of unity and multiplicity themselves. 

The Ghanavyūha Sūtra, composed within the same context as the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra and Tathāgatagarbha literature, presents a richly poetic exploration of Buddha-Nature (buddhadhātu) and consciousness-only (vijñāptimātra). This text posits that all phenomena (dharmas) originate from a deluded mind, yet, when this originating mind is purified, it reveals its inherently pure Nirvāṇic nature, epitomized by the Pure Land known as Ghanavyūha (Dense Array). The Sūtra articulates how misapprehensions of pure consciousness engender duality, leading to the manifestation of a multiplicitous world, which, while inherently pure, is clouded by human delusions, thus giving rise to suffering.

In his Enneads (3rd century), Plotinus articulates a remarkably similar vision, positing an ineffable unity—the One—from which all multiplicity derives. This cosmos, he suggests, is a manifestation through layers of delusion, mirroring the Ghanavyūha’s portrayal of the inherently pure mind. Both traditions advocate a return to this fundamental unity; in Buddhism, through meditation and dialectic reasoning out of delusion, and in Neoplatonism, through dialectic contemplation.

This paper presents the outcomes of the first English translation of the Ghanavyūha Sūtra from the Chinese translations by Divākara (7th century) and Amoghavajra (8th century), enriched with commentary by the third patriarch of Huáyán, Fǎzàng. By aligning the sūtra’s interpretations in China with Plotinus’ thought in the Enneads, this study utilizes a comparative philosophical analysis to illuminate both the similarities and unique aspects of these systems. While this investigation does not seek to prove historical influences between Neoplatonism and Buddhism, it demonstrates the utility of comparative studies in refining our understanding of mystical and dialectical methodologies. This comparative approach not only deepens our appreciation of each tradition’s philosophical sophistication but also advances our grasp of how such traditions articulate the journey from delusion to enlightenment.

In Essay 9, Proclus reports on Theodorus of Asine's arguments for his view that the virtues of men and women are the same. In his fourth argument, Theodorus argues from the commonality of individual parts of women and men's bodies and souls that the purpose, perfection, and virtues of their bodies and souls are the same. Proclus agrees with Theodorus' conclusion, but is troubled by Theodorus’ neglect of an important qualifier that appears in both the Republic and Timaeus: even though the virtues of women and men are the same, women are by nature inferior to men. In Essays 8 and 9, Proclus goes beyond what we find in Plato to provide an account of this natural inferiority. Notably, he theorises that there is a real distinction between masculine and feminine souls, and that 'masculine souls are more capable by nature than feminine [souls]' (<αἱ> ἀρρενωποὶ ψυχαὶ τῶν θηλυπρεπῶν δυνατώτεραι).

In the above, we see Theodorus and Proclus wrestling over the legacy of Plato and his comments on gender. Where, according to Baltzly 2013 and Tarrant 2017, Theodorus was content to take the remarks on gender in the Timaeus non-literally, Proclus believed that Plato's comments were to be taken literally, and created a metaphysical differentiation between two kinds of souls to support it. In the debates between different Classical South Asian Buddhist sects, we see similar discussions about the Buddha's assertion that there is a 'man indriya' and 'woman indriya', which I collectively call gender indriyas. The prominent school of Vaibhāṣika Ābhidharmikas took the mention of these two indriyas to be significant, given that they were part of a list of twenty-two indriyas. They believed that the gender indriyas required metaphysical accounts of their own, and in doing so provided an account of ultimately real material entities that explained and legitimized the conceptual differentiation of humans into women and men. Much like Theodorus' choice to discount the claims in the Timaeus, the Mahāyāna position found in the Lotus Sūtra and Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra also chooses to make no mention of these gender indriyas. The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra takes Śāriputra to be a representative of the Abhidharma position, portraying him as a dogmatic figure who is so attached to rules and concepts that he is unable to truly understand emptiness as it relates to gender and other topics. The text depicts a goddess’ successful attempt to shock Śāriputra out of his rigid adherence to doctrine in favour of understanding the ultimate truth of emptiness.

With this comparison, my hope is to not only compare the different metaphysics of gender proposed by Theodorus, Proclus, and the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, but to ask a hermeneutical question about what it means to be the inheritors of the legacies of influential thinkers like Plato and the Buddha. Which of their words do we decide to treat as definitive (nītattha), what can we decide is merely provisional (neyyattha), and on what basis should this decision be made? And finally, at what point and in what respects should we reject their claims on gender as unsalvageable?

As a philosophical innovator and inaugural figure of Neoplatonism, Plotinus did not advance an ontological separation in his metaphysics. On the contrary, throughout the Enneads, Plotinus asserts that nothing is cut off and all levels are always interlaced. This interlacement is derivative of Plotinus’ contemplative cosmological order; all things are engaged in interpenetrating contemplation, albeit to varying degrees. Similarly, the original Buddhist dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda) in the Sūtra Piṭaka, one of the three main divisions of the Tripiṭaka, corresponds directly to the middle two of the Four Noble truths: origin (dukkhasamudaya) and cessation (dukkhanirodha). The Sūtra Piṭaka’s dependent arising is then further developed into a core doctrine of the Flower Garland Sutra (Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra), where the inextricability of all worlds or levels of reality is advanced, a foundational principle of the Chinese Huayan School (華嚴), Korean Hwaôm, and Japanese Kegon schools. The Huayan school focused on dependent origination to redefine its idea of the dependent arising of all beings upon all other things, whether phenomena, principles, or dharmas. This study will draw upon the Flower Garland Sutra’s innovative design of the original Buddhist commitment to cross-compare with Plotinus’ inseparable cosmological order. The result of this comparative analysis will challenge the classical Neoplatonic narrative that advances a segregated hypostases model of Soul, Intellect and One.

«Omnes mentium species possunt coniungi deo»; «Sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ». 

These two statements, the first being the title of a chapter in Marsilio Ficino’s Theologia Platonica (XVIII, 8), the second being a crucial statement in the tathāgatagarbha literature, seem to insist on the same fundamental idea. 

Developing the crucial Neoplatonic theme of the unio mystica of the soul with God, the Italian Renaissance philosopher argues in his works that each singular mens, being the most excellent part of the soul, is also part of a supreme and divine mens, and therefore can free itself from the darkness that shades it to unite with the latter’s pure light. The capacity of the mens to rejoin the divine is grounded in the absolute presence of the divine in the mens itself, thus in the soul. God, in fact, penetrates everything (deus omnia penetrat), has the property of pervasiveness: every point on the “line” of time intersects it, as it is omnipresent and eternal; every point on the surface of space intersects it, as it is ubiquitous and extended to the last edge of reality. Consequently, the unio mystica of the soul with God implies the spatiotemporal amplification of the mens itself. In God, the mens is everywhere at the same time. 

In some texts of the tathāgatagarbha literature, notably in the Ratnagotravibhāga(-vyākhyā), the relation between the Buddhahood (buddhatva) and the single sentient being (sattva) is “structured” in a similar way. The “cause” (hetu) of enlightenment (bodhi) lies in the tathāgatagarbha’s capacity of being enlightened (i.e. in its being “bodhya”). This is because the “nature” of the Tathāgata (tathāgatadhātu) is all-pervading (sarvatraga), and thus provides the purity of the nature of the mind (cittaprakṛti) of living beings. In other words, the all-pervasiveness of the “principle” makes possible for the mind to be purified from the defilements that obstruct enlightenment. The Tathāgata, the Ratna. states, reaches up to the limit of space and lasts as long as the extreme limit of the world. The pervasiveness of the tathāgatadhātu – or, in the Neoplatonic sense, that of God or the One – is the very root of enlightenment. Understanding the actual “structure” of pervasiveness itself – what pervades what and how – is therefore crucial in order to define the conditions of the non-dual awareness of the Tathāgata – or the conditions of the unio mystical. 

Unlike the Prajñāpāramitā, while affirming the vacuity of the defilements that "cover" the garbha, the Ratna. affirms the astiva, and thus aśūnya, character of the garbha itself. While this facilitates comparison with the Neoplatonic doctrines based on the principle of the immortality of the soul – defined as a pure form – and the eternity of the mind, the function and definition of the tathāgatagarbha and the Neoplatonic definition of the soul are not, however, identifiable. For while the former plays a fundamentally "soteriological" role, the latter becomes in Neoplatonism the pivot of an entire philosophy of Nature. In line with the doctrine expounded by Plato in the Timaeus, the world itself – and, as Ficino states, even the elements and celestial bodies – possesses a soul. In Giordano Bruno's system, the soul of the world (anima mundi) is at the center of a pantheistic and immanentist cosmology. Nevertheless, exploring some possibilities for dialogue between the two doctrines may help to understand more deeply the role of pervasiveness in relation to the freeing of the mind from that which prevents it from shining in unity with the uncreated light of its principle. 

Buddhists and Neoplatonists both had to contend with astrology as a major intellectual force in their respective cultures. Belief in astrological determinism was widespread across Eurasia in the Common Era. This paper will address the differences in the fundamental cosmologies of these two traditions (e.g., the Concentric Spheres vs. Mt. Sumeru and Four Continents), as well as the conceptions of the astral deities. Unlike in the Platonic worldview, the planetary deities (Sūrya, Candra, etc.) and stellar deities (nakṣatras) in the Buddhist worldview are mortal beings. Although they hold lofty positions, they are still fundamentally existing in saṃsāra (cyclic existence). Early on, Buddhists expressly held that it is theoretically possible to be reborn as Sūrya or Candra, whereas for the Platonic school, it would be challenging to imagine how a person could come to inhabit the ensouled spheres above that were set in motion by the Demiurge, as explained in Timaeus. We will then examine the comments on and criticisms and/or endorsements of astrology by various authors. This study will aim to illustrate the common ground but also the inherent differences between Platonic and Buddhist understandings of the stars and their effects on fate. This paper will primarily focus on Plato, Plotinus, and Iamblichus as the representative Platonic thinkers, with due reference to the major Hellenistic astrologers (namely, Dorotheus and Claudius Ptolemy). Numerous Buddhist texts are available, but this study will look at those with ample discussions of astrology. For example, the Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi (Cn. Dari jing 大日經) and its Chinese commentary by the monks Yixing一行 (673–727) and Śubhakarasiṃha (Shanwuwei 善無畏; 637–735). These works capture a significant moment in the history of early Mantrayāna (Vajrayāna). In addition, we will consider the cosmology of the Kālacakra Tantra, which represents late-stage Vajrayāna in India.  

If Plotinus can be more easily related to Tibetan dzogchen by its (quasi-)absence of formal practices and visualizations, Iamblichus and his theurgic practices would be more easily compared to Tibetan vajrayāna and its "skillful means" (skt. upāya, tib. thabs).

The written traces of Neoplatonic theurgical rituals in Iamblichus (and in the Chaldean Oracles) seem to include 1. visualizations, 2. prayers, 3. recitations (mantras) and in addition 4. the animation of statues. All these elements appear to be common to both the Neoplatonist and Buddhist traditions. We will attempt to show the possible convergences between them, but also some notable differences.

In order to do this, we will start from major aspects of the so-called generation or creation phase (sk. utpattikrama / tib. bskyed rim) of the mahāyoga of Tibetan vajrayana buddhism, fundamental elements of the structure and functioning of the sādhanas (tib. sgrub thabs), the skillful means of vajrayāna, particularly Nyingmapa, to see what might be found in common in Neoplatonism.

The heart of the comparison will concern the place that can be given, or not, in Iamblichus to the following elements: 1. the three samadhis (skt. trisamādhi; tib. ting nge 'dzin rnam pa gsum), 2. emptiness (skt. śūnyatā, tib. stong pa nyid)) as origin and end of the double movement 3. of emanation and resorption (tib. 'phro 'du) of visualizations, and 4. the functioning of the three sattvas (beings, deities): the support being (sk. samayasattva / tib. dam tshig sems dpa'), the wisdom being (sk. jñānasattva / ye shes sems dpa') and the absorption being (sk. samādhisattva / ting nge 'dzin sems dpa'). 

We will compare them with some passages in Iamblique's De Mysteriis, including those concerning the status of non-material sunthemata or sumbolon and their role in the theurgic practices (e.g. DM, I.12, II.11, III.15, IV.2-3, V.26) to conclude about some convergences and differences between both traditions, according to the material used in this talk.

For those interested in pursuing the idea of contemplative expediencies, or what the Buddhists call in Sanskrit “upaya,” expedient means, especially in the Tibetan tradition of Dzogchen, I offer this comparison between Ennead V.8.3.15-18 and the well-known “pointing out instructions” associated with contemporary Dzogchen lineages, as well as ancient teachers. 1 In this paper, I discuss parallel exercises in Tibetan traditions and try to show the radical nature of Plotinus’ so-called “spiritual exercises,” which are, I argue, reflective of his pedagogical interest in pointing directly to his listener’s intelligible identity. Plotinus’ purpose in writing the treatise, On Intelligible Beauty, as he says early in the treatise in chapter 3,is to give the reader an example from within their own experience. This reliance on the reader’s experience is utterly unique and unparalleled by anything else in all of Greek philosophy. In this reading of the Phaedrus, Plotinus grants to the reader a taste or maybe what he calls in his treatise On Beauty (I.6) “traces” or “footprints: ἴχνη” (I.6.6.8) of the intelligible. In V.8 Plotinus attempts to demonstrate the relationship between intellect and soul through, he says, a kind of ostensive definition. To start with, Plotinus suggests that the soul may find intellect by “looking within: εἰς τὸ εἴσω βλέψας,” V.8.2.42. He then goes on to say: What image could we take for it? For every image is drawn from something inferior. But then the image must come from intellect, in such a way that we do not conceive it by means of an image but like taking a portion of gold as an indicator of an entire gold piece; and if the gold that has been taken is not pure, we must purify it by deed and word to show that this piece in its entirely is not gold but only the gold content in the piece. In the same way in this case too we may conceive from our intellect, once it has been purified. V.8.3.15-18. Smith. This synecdochal approach to intelligible beauty initiates what Plotinus in chapter 2 calls a zetesis (ζητήσεις), a seeing of oneself. a looking within (εἰς τὸ εἴσω βλέψας) and a recollection ἀναμνήσθητι.. By framing the myth of Phaedrus as offering the occasion for this inquiry, Plotinus invites the reader to inhabit the space of the hyperouranian topos. This is an immersive reading that enables “anyone” to enact the narrative of the myth, breaking through, lifting up the head of the charioteer (ὑπεροχῇ τῇ ἑαυτῶν κεφαλῇ). Plotinus’ exegesis of the myth begins with an invocation of Homer, “καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥεῖα ζώειν ἐκεῖ—Iliad 6.138, referring to the life of the Olympians, and then glosses this quotation with a reference to Phaedrus: “ἀλήθεια δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ γενέτειρα καὶ τροφὸς καὶ οὐσία καὶ τροφή, truth is their mother, their nurse, their being, their food.”  

Here a brief introduction to “pointing out” instructions may be found in the works of Keith Dowman’s Dzogchen Teaching Series.

For a brief overview of some practice instructions designed to help the student uncover the nature of their own mind and its natural luminosity, consult Schmidt, M. B., ed. Dzogchen Essentials. The Path that Clarifies Confusion. Ranjung Yeshe Publications. Hongkong. 2004, in particular the tradition instructions of Padmasambhava, pp. 40-45.

For an overview of Tibetan Buddhist practices see Powers, J. A Concise Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism. Snow Lion. 2008. Signals the attitude to take in this practice: to be at ease, and to nourish oneself with the text.

The relationship of unity and diversity has been a perennial issue for human societies, and thus it is no surprise that it has also posed a continual challenge for philosophy, metaphysics, and religious systems of thought and practice. The relationship between the One and the many was a particularly salient topic of speculation in the Neoplatonic religious philosophy and metaphysics of Plotinus (c.205–70) and Proclus (412–495). The widely held textbook notion of Platonism is that of a dualistic system of thought, denigrating concrete phenomena comprised of matter as evil or faulty images of the more real world of ideas, but in Neoplatonism the relationship between the One, the ground or source of being, and the myriad things is far more nuanced. Plotinus, following Aristotle’s emphasis of final cause, held that the “whatness” of an existence is its unique way of participating in the Good, and the importance of final cause or telos was later developed by Proclus into the idea that each thing reverts to the One—its ultimate cause—by just being what it is, that is, by contributing to its final cause, collapsing the duality of procession and reversion (see Pearl 2007, 39). Proclus held that all things exercised this agency, including nonliving and nonsentient existences, playing a role in their own creation and thus manifesting Good and Beauty in their unique ways. Some Japanese Buddhists also elevated the full manifestation of each existence’s inherent way of being to the status of religious ultimacy. The notion of an “inherent way of being” would seem alien to Buddhism given its core doctrines of nonself and emptiness, which teach the absence of any fixed, inherent existence. However, the Lotus Sutra’s equation of ultimate reality with abiding within an “inherent Dharma position” (Chn., fazhu fawei 法住法位; Miaofa lianhua jing, T262.9.9b10) was developed by Buddhists within the Tendai sect as well as the Zen Monk Dōgen (1200-1252) into the notion that existences partake in ultimate reality teleologically, by simply being themselves—fully manifesting their being, and comparable to the Neoplatonists, this agency was extended to not only sentient life but also to non-living and insentient existences. 

This paper will bring into dialogue Neoplatonism’s notion of the reversion of existences to the One as manifesting their inherent, determinate being and Japanese Buddhist conceptions that manifesting one’s natural way of being—abiding in one’s “inherent dharma position”—is partaking fully in the realm of awakening. Of comparative interest will be Dōgen’s extension of inherent Dharma position to his assertions that existences manifest awakening by “the total exertion of a single dharma” (Jpn., ippō gūjin 一法究尽) as well as by their “total functioning” (Jpn., zenki 全機) (see Kim 1987). Another area of comparative exploration will be the Neoplatonic extension of the agency of reversion to nonliving and nonsentient things and the Buddhist position that insentient and nonliving existences also partake in the realm of awakening simply by manifesting their being— what was commonly known as “the actualization of awakening by grasses and trees” (Jpn., sōmoku jōbutsu 草木成仏) (see Sueki 2015). Although many Japanese Buddhists were convinced of this, they often struggled to explain how such existences could “practice,” and Proclus’s account of reversion by nonvital and vegetive existences may provide hints for an account of the praxis undertaken by nonliving and insentient existences. 

Another question to consider is if existences’ actualization of buddhahood by manifesting their “whatness” could be understood as a kind of “reversion” in any way, and if so, what do we learn by interrogating both Neoplatonic and Buddhist accounts of procession and reversion together. In exoteric Japanese Buddhist explanations, the nonduality of the ultimate and provisional truths, or in Tendai, the nonexclusive truth of the middle way, describe the immanent identity of phenomena and the ultimate truth, and so “reversion” would seem to be absent. However, Proclus’ collapse of the duality of procession and reversion by making final causation a ground for existences means that procession and reversion are two but not two, a state of nonduality which would be an unavoidable necessity if existences are to return by manifesting themselves. And if we adopt Filler’s radical understanding of the One as “pure relationality,” Buddhism and Neoplatonism come even closer (see Filler 2023). In the case of esoteric explanations of the actualization of buddhahood, we find a clear analogy to procession with the depiction of existence arising out of the body of the cosmic Buddha, Mahāvairocana (see Miyamoto 1961). But here too we discover an underlying phenomenon of relations, as this Buddha is also understood as a personification of the Sanskrit letter A, the source of all things, which, as a letter, is inherently an embodiment of relationality. 

References 

Filler, James. 2023. Heidegger, Neoplatonism, and the History of Being: Relation as an Ontological Ground. Palgrave Macmillan. 

Kim, Hee-Jin. 1987. Dōgen Kigen: Mystical Realist. University of Arizona Press. 

Miaofa lianhua jing 妙法蓮華経 [Sutra of the Lotus Flower of the Wondrous Dharma/Lotus Sutra]. In vol. 9, Taishō shinshū daizōkyō [The Buddhist canon, Taishō period new edition], edited by Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe, 1-62. Issai kyō kankōkai, 1924–32. 

Miyamoto, Shōson. 1961. “Sōmoku kokudo kaigu jōbutsu no busshōron teki igi to sono sakusha”「草木 国土悉皆成仏」の仏性論的意義とその作者 [The implications of “the buddhahood of all grasses, trees, and the lands of the nation in their entirety” for treatises on buddha nature and their authors]. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies vol. 9, issue 18: 262-291. 

Pearl, Eric D. 2007. Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite. State University of New York Press. 

Sueki, Fumihiko. 2015. Sōmoku jōbutsu no shisō 草木成仏の思想 [The concept of the actualization of buddhahood by grasses and trees]. Sanga.

The relationship of unity and diversity has been a perennial issue for human societies, and thus it is no surprise that it has also posed a continual challenge for philosophy, metaphysics, and religious systems of thought and practice. The relationship between the One and the many was a particularly salient topic of speculation in the Neoplatonic religious philosophy and metaphysics of Plotinus (c.205–70) and Proclus (412–495). The widely held textbook notion of Platonism is that of a dualistic system of thought, denigrating concrete phenomena comprised of matter as evil or faulty images of the more real world of ideas, but in Neoplatonism the relationship between the One, the ground or source of being, and the myriad things is far more nuanced. Plotinus, following Aristotle’s emphasis of final cause, held that the “whatness” of an existence is its unique way of participating in the Good, and the importance of final cause or telos was later developed by Proclus into the idea that each thing reverts to the One—its ultimate cause—by just being what it is, that is, by contributing to its final cause, collapsing the duality of procession and reversion (see Pearl 2007, 39). Proclus held that all things exercised this agency, including nonliving and nonsentient existences, playing a role in their own creation and thus manifesting Good and Beauty in their unique ways. Some Japanese Buddhists also elevated the full manifestation of each existence’s inherent way of being to the status of religious ultimacy. The notion of an “inherent way of being” would seem alien to Buddhism given its core doctrines of nonself and emptiness, which teach the absence of any fixed, inherent existence. However, the Lotus Sutra’s equation of ultimate reality with abiding within an “inherent Dharma position” (Chn., fazhu fawei 法住法位; Miaofa lianhua jing, T262.9.9b10) was developed by Buddhists within the Tendai sect as well as the Zen Monk Dōgen (1200-1252) into the notion that existences partake in ultimate reality teleologically, by simply being themselves—fully manifesting their being, and comparable to the Neoplatonists, this agency was extended to not only sentient life but also to non-living and insentient existences. 

This paper will bring into dialogue Neoplatonism’s notion of the reversion of existences to the One as manifesting their inherent, determinate being and Japanese Buddhist conceptions that manifesting one’s natural way of being—abiding in one’s “inherent dharma position”—is partaking fully in the realm of awakening. Of comparative interest will be Dōgen’s extension of inherent Dharma position to his assertions that existences manifest awakening by “the total exertion of a single dharma” (Jpn., ippō gūjin 一法究尽) as well as by their “total functioning” (Jpn., zenki 全機) (see Kim 1987). Another area of comparative exploration will be the Neoplatonic extension of the agency of reversion to nonliving and nonsentient things and the Buddhist position that insentient and nonliving existences also partake in the realm of awakening simply by manifesting their being— what was commonly known as “the actualization of awakening by grasses and trees” (Jpn., sōmoku jōbutsu 草木成仏) (see Sueki 2015). Although many Japanese Buddhists were convinced of this, they often struggled to explain how such existences could “practice,” and Proclus’s account of reversion by nonvital and vegetive existences may provide hints for an account of the praxis undertaken by nonliving and insentient existences. 

Another question to consider is if existences’ actualization of buddhahood by manifesting their “whatness” could be understood as a kind of “reversion” in any way, and if so, what do we learn by interrogating both Neoplatonic and Buddhist accounts of procession and reversion together. In exoteric Japanese Buddhist explanations, the nonduality of the ultimate and provisional truths, or in Tendai, the nonexclusive truth of the middle way, describe the immanent identity of phenomena and the ultimate truth, and so “reversion” would seem to be absent. However, Proclus’ collapse of the duality of procession and reversion by making final causation a ground for existences means that procession and reversion are two but not two, a state of nonduality which would be an unavoidable necessity if existences are to return by manifesting themselves. And if we adopt Filler’s radical understanding of the One as “pure relationality,” Buddhism and Neoplatonism come even closer (see Filler 2023). In the case of esoteric explanations of the actualization of buddhahood, we find a clear analogy to procession with the depiction of existence arising out of the body of the cosmic Buddha, Mahāvairocana (see Miyamoto 1961). But here too we discover an underlying phenomenon of relations, as this Buddha is also understood as a personification of the Sanskrit letter A, the source of all things, which, as a letter, is inherently an embodiment of relationality. 

References 

Filler, James. 2023. Heidegger, Neoplatonism, and the History of Being: Relation as an Ontological Ground. Palgrave Macmillan. 

Kim, Hee-Jin. 1987. Dōgen Kigen: Mystical Realist. University of Arizona Press. 

Miaofa lianhua jing 妙法蓮華経 [Sutra of the Lotus Flower of the Wondrous Dharma/Lotus Sutra]. In vol. 9, Taishō shinshū daizōkyō [The Buddhist canon, Taishō period new edition], edited by Junjirō Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe, 1-62. Issai kyō kankōkai, 1924–32. 

Miyamoto, Shōson. 1961. “Sōmoku kokudo kaigu jōbutsu no busshōron teki igi to sono sakusha”「草木 国土悉皆成仏」の仏性論的意義とその作者 [The implications of “the buddhahood of all grasses, trees, and the lands of the nation in their entirety” for treatises on buddha nature and their authors]. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies vol. 9, issue 18: 262-291. 

Pearl, Eric D. 2007. Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite. State University of New York Press. 

Sueki, Fumihiko. 2015. Sōmoku jōbutsu no shisō 草木成仏の思想 [The concept of the actualization of buddhahood by grasses and trees]. Sanga.

On the surface of it, care (karuna) in Buddhism is very different from its parallel (epimeleia) in Neoplatonism. Care is extremely prominent in Buddhism, particularly in Mahayana Buddhism in which to a large extent it is the Boddhisatva ideal that governs soteriological conceptions. Yet, while it probably merits the place of “chief virtue” in Buddhism, care might seem to be largely confined to ethics understood in a rather pragmatic sense. By contrast, in Neoplatonism care appears to be much less important than it is in Buddhism. In fact, there are passages in Neoplatonic thinkers where a this-worldly care, dispersing energies in the world of multiplicity, is portrayed as competing with the work of unification. Yet, care is also a key in distinguishing Neoplatonism from Gnosticism. Moreover, it is crucial in explaining how the power (dunamis) of higher realities is at work at the level of soul. In this paper, I compare Neoplatonic and Buddhist notions of care. By putting Buddhist and Neoplatonic understandings of care in parallel it is possible to discern some fundamental similarities and differences between these two general movements. In this study, I attempt to see to what extent care can be understood as a cosmological principle in Buddhism. I also ask if care in Neoplatonism might function as a response to something like dukkha in Buddhism. I take into account what seems to be the great gulf between the metaphysical conceptions of Buddhism and Neoplatonism. I suggest that an investigation of care sheds light on their respective views on non-duality. My remarks on Neoplatonism rely primarily on Plotinus while my remarks on Buddhism draw on (a more eclectic range of) Mahayana texts. 

The Name of God is as key to Christian metaphysics as the Name of Amida is to Shin Buddhist soteriology. Yet, if metaphysics is properly applicable to Buddhist thought, the opposite can also hold. The Hebrew Tetragrammaton is voiced anew in the Name of Jesus, “God saves,” and the relationship between Divine Being and cosmic salvation is drawn out of these Names in the kenotic hymn of Philippians 2. Buttressing the scriptural witness with the Platonic motif of “hymning,” Dionysius envisages the cosmos as the speech act of the self-abnegating Logos in which sentient beings participate through liturgical and symbolic orientation towards God. There is considerable conceptual overlap between Dionysian hymning and Shinran’s exposition of the Nembutsu, in which the speech-act of Amida’s Primal Vow enacts itself through the sentient being who participates with true shinjin. In both cases, priority is given to an eternal and absolute speech-act, whilst safeguarding against radical dualism by allowing for participation of finite beings in an infinite Name-word which is at once constitutive of all things and calls them into unity. 

The Stoics are known for their theory of eternal recurrence, according to which the world repeats itself in an endless series of cycles. This peculiar theory, likely inspired by Pythagoreanism and other philosophical traditions, has occasionally been paralleled by scholars with certain Buddhist ideas. Although relatively little studied, this theory also finds echoes in Neoplatonic views of the cosmic cycle, as can be seen in the works of Plotinus and Proclus. While early Christian thinkers such as Augustine criticised the doctrine of eternal recurrence, scholarly attention has predominantly focused on its cosmological and metaphysical aspects, leaving its ethical and soteriological implications, if any, largely unexplored. This paper seeks to delineate the similarities and differences in the Stoic and Neoplatonic conceptions of eternal recurrence and to explore their ethical and soteriological implications, particularly in relation to their views on the non-durational or atemporal nature of genuine happiness and salvation. In considering their theories, it will draw in particular on two modern studies: the first is Pierre Hadot’s exploration of the concentration on the present moment practised by ancient Greek philosophers, especially the Stoics; the second is Shuzo Kuki’s 1928 lecture ‘La notion du temps et la reprise sur le temps en Orient’, which discusses the conception of eternal recurrence in relation to its intersections with ‘Oriental’ thought. 

Shinran’s (1273-1263) teachings rest on the Primal Vows (本願) of Amida Buddha, which, in turn, is understood to be a manifestation “Oneness” (dharmakāya 法身, dharmatā法性, oneness 一如, jinen hōni自然法爾, etc.). Shinran regarded this Oneness as the ultimate reality that is inconceivable and ineffable for ordinary unenlightened beings. Plotinus (204/5 - 270) similarly attributed a similar set of descriptions to what he regarded to be ultimate reality, which he called, the “One.” I shall, in this paper, seek to clarify Shinran’s understanding of Oneness in comparison to Plotinus’ understanding of the One.

Since the Milinda and Nāgasena dialogues, Buddhism is well known for its critique of any unity attributed to the objects of our perception or to ourselves. This critique is based on the idea that the unity of the things in the world we experience daily would actually result from a conceptual construction without any absolute foundation in reality. Without realizing it, we superimpose unifying concepts on reality, which is ultimately multiple and discontinuous. For example, while taking names too seriously, we attribute a self (ātman), i.e. an autonomous essence, to the king’s chariot, when it is only the sum of several material elements, which we group under the same label for reasons of practical convenience. This is a source of attachment and suffering. Liberation can therefore only come from a renunciation of our tendency to see unity everywhere around us and, above all, in ourselves, and this can only be achieved by renouncing conceptual thought, which has only conventional origin and value. In contrast, Plotinus ultimately criticizes the activity of the intellect in the idea that its always various, albeit mutually complementary categories (the Same and the Other, Being, Rest and Movement; cf. the “great kinds” of being in Plato’s Sophist), are incapable of grasping the principle of all things, the One, in its radical simplicity. The domain of the concept is not up to the One, and that is why it must be surpassed in the ultimate mystical experience. “Cut off all things!” Plotinus enjoins us at the end of Treatise 49, mentioning there not only discursive thought and language, but also the intelligible forms themselves as they think themselves in their relative simplicity and in their stable eternity. So here, conceptual thought still suffers from a lack of unity. But this contrast relying on opposite values attributed to unity might be simplistic and deserves to be examined more closely. First, Plotinus is far from recognizing real units in sensible perception and therefore he is hardly concerned with Vasubandhu’s warnings on this point. In Plato and still in Plotinus, in contradistinction to Aristotle, the very essence of a thing is distinct from this thing, which is ultimately only an aggregate of properties around a neutral substrate, without internal unifying principle, at least for what is not alive (the case of the living, with the seminal logos derived from stoicism, is more complex). So to speak, the self (ātman) is not the thing itself, but is transcendent! Moreover matter always remains external to all the images of intelligible unity that it can receive within it. Intellectual and discursive categories are unsuitable for it too, but for reasons symmetrical to those concerning their inadequacy to the One. So Plotinus is quite capable of thinking of and denouncing a conceptuality that would sin by excess of unification. Then, even if we admit, with Vasubandhu for example, that any substantial unity in the world has only conventional value, it is difficult to see how, in the eyes of the Buddhist himself, the One posited by Plotinus beyond being could result from a superimposition and an artificial hypostatization, since it is the very condition of all hypostases. Buddhists should question the unifying power that organizes the illusions constituting our ordinary experience of the world. Moreover, Vasubandhu does not refuse all forms of unity, since he admits some kind of unity of each elementary dharma endowed with a special svabhāva, because the conceptual construction must have materials on which to operate. This will be vigorously reproached by the Madhyamaka school: causal nexus between phenomenal events is incompatible with any intrinsic nature of what is connected thus.  

Finally, according to Plotinus, the mystical experience of the One consists in a dissolution of the belief in the reality of the self, and of this reality itself, whereas the level of intellect was characterized by self-affirmation and self-knowledge. The one who has this experience is not its individual and sovereign subject, but becomes this experience itself: 

Ἑαυτὸν μὲν οὖν ἰδὼν τότε, ὅτε ὁρᾷ, τοιοῦτον ὄψεται, μᾶλλον δὲ αὑτῷ τοιούτῳ συνέσται καὶ τοιοῦτον αἰσθήσεται ἁπλοῦν γενόμενον. Τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ «ὄψεται» λεκτέον, «τὸ δὲ ὀφθέν», εἴπερ δεῖ δύο ταῦτα λέγειν, τό τε ὁρῶν καὶ ὁρώμενον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἓν ἄμφω· τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος. Τότε μὲν οὖν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὐδὲ διακρίνει ὁ ὁρῶν οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο, ἀλλ' οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς οὐδ' αὑτοῦ συντελεῖ ἐκεῖ, κἀκείνου γενόμενος ἕν ἐστιν ὥσπερ κέντρῳ κέντρον συνάψας. 

Since [the seeing part of our soul] sees itself when it sees, this part will see itself such as [its object]; even more: it will be united with itself as being so and it will feel just like this object, as simple as it. But maybe we should not say “he will see” or “the seen object”. For, by using these words, we have to admit two things, the seer and the seen, whereas it would be temerarious to say that both together are just one. Thus, at this very moment, the seer does neither see nor distinguish nor imagine two things. But he has become other, he is no longer himself nor self-belonging; he is merged with this object, he is one with it: as if his own center coincided with center of his object (VI, 9, 10, personal translation). 

The experience of the One is just as much an experience of the dissolution of the self. The discovery of the true One can only be achieved by deconstructing and surpassing artificial or inferior units. Thus, it could be that, on both sides, the knowledge that leads to salvation is not the recognition of the omnipotence and omnipresence of unity or, on the contrary, of its radical absence, but rather the exact knowledge of what is really one and what is not, and of the various possible degrees of unity. And this implies deploying conceptual thought to the end before, perhaps, freeing oneself from it. This is a conjecture that deserves to be tested against the texts. 

This talk will propose an integrative perspective on consciousness, viewing it as an ontological realm distinct from the psychological level of mental activity but accessible through it. Specifically, the Abhidhammic insight that we never deal with consciousness itself but only with our awareness of consciousness will be compared to Plotinus' distinction between the Intellect and the Psyche. This comparison will help identify Plotinus' Nous with the Abhidhammic notion of consciousness. Following the ideas of Merab Mamardashvili, a Soviet-era Georgian philosopher who remains largely untranslated and unfamiliar in the West, the presentation will explore the idea that the goal of Plato's and Plotinus’ philosophy is similar to that of Buddhism, namely to initiate an awakening of consciousness through the self-study of the thought process.

Plotinus’s biographer, Porphyry, relates that Plotinus attained ecstatic union with the One (henosis) four times in an ineffable actuality during the years he knew him. According to Enneads VI,7,25 and VI,9,4, comprehension of the One is neither by scientific understanding nor by intellection. To facilitate the purely contemplative henosis and become assimilated to the One, the soul has to cease thinking and living since the One is beyond both. Scholars differ, however, as to what kind of contemplative practice Plotinus actually envisaged to go beyond the intellect and identify with the One. According to Werner Beierwaltes (1931–2019), the non-thinking of the One is best understood as the perfection of the movement of reflection and the highest form of thinking, which has overcome all difference in thinking. Against Beierwaltes, it is argued that the intellect does not ascend towards the One but dissolves in it. After reconstructing and discussing the Plotinian henosis within the broader context of Neoplatonic practices to attain union with the One (Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius), it will be compared to Buddhist contemplative practices and deep contemplative states, especially the path of practice leading to the death-like trance of nirodhasamāpatti.

Both the Neoplatonist and Buddhist traditions approach the philosophical conundrum of the relation of the ‘one/absolute’ to the ‘many/relative’ as a question of existential import: not merely a question for theoretical investigation, it is also the fundamental problematic for spiritual practitioners, the ‘one great matter’ pertaining to human life and death, wisdom and identity. Teachers and texts in both traditions expound and promote a vision of a human flourishing as an outworking of a transformed or healed relationship between the individual and the ground of its being. Far from offering a merely intellectual ‘solution’, they transmit a range of practices to foster and sustain such transformation or healing.  

This paper will explore the practices of ‘returning to the source’ by means of two contrasting case-studies of highly influential spiritual teachers: from the Neoplatonist tradition, the seventh-century Christian monk and saint Maximus Confessor, and from the Buddhist tradition the twelfth-century Chinese Zen master Hongzhi Zhengjue. For each writer, I will begin by investigating their understanding of the nature of the source, and how the ‘return’ is conceived, before turning to explore their teachings of ‘practices of return’.  Along the way, we notice how these masters of their respective traditions situate themselves in relation to questions of embodiment, modes of consciousness, of devotion and of ethical practice. For both Maximus and Hongzhi, despite all the crosses and thorny brambles encountered on the path of life, these spiritual practices are a source of joy and delight; for these teachers and their communities of practice, the gate is open, and those who enter will find themselves lost in wonder and love.